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Globally, climate change is having significant effects on ecosystems and its 
services. In this context, food security is topping the list of concerns. For a country like 
Brazil, a leading agriculture producer, sustainability is key to ensure long-term prosperity. 
As the primary home of one of the world’s most important ecosystems, the Amazon, Brazil 
has struggled to balance the economic benefits of agriculture development with the 
environmental impacts – namely deforestation. For many years, Brazil was viewed as an 
environmental steward when it successfully slashed deforestation rates through command-
and-control environmental policy; however, as of late this trend is reversing. As climate 
action and discourse grows globally, it is important to take stock of how environmental 
policy has evolved in Brazil, how it has affected deforestation and the influence agriculture 
development has had. This policy study will combine time series analysis of agriculture 
production, trade and deforestation with the evolution of Brazilian environmental policy to 
illustrate the fragility of policy and the influence competing interests can have on its 
enforcement and effectiveness. The case study of Brazil will demonstrate that despite 
having strong environmental protection policies in place, their enforcement and success is 
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Climate change has a myriad of impacts on the planet and those who inhabit it. 
Food security has become a top global concern in the face of climate change and 
environmental degradation. Rising temperatures and sea levels, extreme weather events, 
and growing variability contribute to an increasingly challenging exercise of addressing 
sustainable development and livelihoods. Expansion in the agriculture sector has meant 
that many countries have benefited from improved livelihood from agriculture. However, 
the sector is not only vulnerable to market dynamics but also at risk of being severely 
impacted by extreme weather events, environmental policies, and their enforcement. If 
resources and the environment are not effectively managed, it could reduce the long-term 
benefits from agriculture expansion. Not only is food supply vulnerable to climate change 
but it also contributes to climate change, through its supply chain and production cycle. 
Agriculture, along with energy from fossil fuels (electricity, heat and transportation), is one 
of the most greenhouse gas (GHG) intensive sectors globally.1 This intersection requires a 
balance between growing agriculture production and limiting contributions to climate 
change.  
The agriculture sector plays an important role in environmental policy formulation, 
enforcement and monitoring, especially for major agriculture producers. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) ranks South America as one of the 
largest agriculture production sub-regions in the world.2 The Food Security Information 
Network notes that climate related shocks and changing weather patterns will impact Latin 
 
1 Ge, Mengpin, and Johannes Friedrich. 2020. 4 Charts Explain Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Countries 
and Sectors. World Resources Institute. February 6. 





America’s 3 agriculture production and prices, as well as put pressure on the economy and 
security.4 The anticipated effects are particularly relevant to Brazil, as the largest economy 
in the region and its agriculture sector and related services are a main economic engine.5 
Brazil is also home to globally significant biomes, namely the Amazon and Cerrado6, 
whose forests absorb exceptional amounts of carbon dioxide. Unsustainable agriculture 
production practices, which includes deforestation, could have disastrous consequences on 
local and global levels. Brazil, aware of the risk and confronted with rapidly rising 
deforestation, put substantial efforts towards decoupling forest cover loss and agriculture 
production. Despite great policy success in the 2000s, by 2015 Brazil again faced rising 
deforestation rates and forest fires in the Amazon and Cerrado regions – often linked to 
agriculture.   
Brazil is at the centre of the climate change conversation because of the country’s 
ecosystem endowment. Since President Bolsonaro took office, this attention has 
intensified, largely in response to anti-environmental rhetoric, scenes of a burning Amazon 
and rapidly escalating deforestation. Brazil is an ideal candidate for study on the 
intersection between environmental and climate policy and agriculture development for 
four reasons: it contains, within its borders, important global ecosystems and abundant 
 
3 Latin America is comprised of Mexico, Central America and South America.  
4 FSNI. 2019. 2019 Global Report on Food Crisis. Food Security Information Network. 
5 CEPEA. 2018. BR Agribusiness GDP – from 1996 to 2019. Center for Advanced Studies on Applied 
Economics. 
6 The entirety of the Amazon biome covers several countries in South America: Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, 
Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana. Throughout the text of this study, 
the Legal Amazon consists of the Brazilian state boundaries while the Amazon, unless specified, refers to 
the Brazilian biome. Specific to Brazil, the Amazon and Legal Amazon will be used interchangeably within 
the text of this paper due to geographic overlap (three states overlap between Legal Amazon and Cerrado) 
and based on the literary source’s reference. Due to geographical overlap, data specific to the Amazon and 
Cerrado will be used where possible to delineate the data and avoid overlap. Appendix 1 includes a map of 
Brazil, outlining which states make up the Amazon, Cerrado and states with overlapping geographies 




natural resources; the country has demonstrated experience in climate and environmental 
policies implemented with varying degrees of success; it is a major agriculture producer 
and trader; and, it presents unique security and development challenges, particularly in 
agriculture producing regions. To better understand the intersectionality of climate change, 
this policy research study will answer the following question: How has agriculture 
development influenced climate and environmental protection policy in Brazil? This policy 
paper will be organized in four sections: background, hypothesis and methodology, data, 
and discussion. Each section will elaborate on and assess the intersection between climate 
and environmental protection policy, and agriculture development. 
BACKGROUND 
Brazil has been central to discourse around environmental protection and climate 
policy related to agriculture. However, there has been a growing disconnect between 
environmental policy and its implementation. To contextualize, this section will provide 
an overview of climate impacts related to agriculture, Brazil’s agriculture sector, and the 
country’s environmental and climate policy, followed by a discussion on international 
climate agreements and foreign policy. This section will close on with a policy analysis.  
CLIMATE IMPACTS RELATED TO AGRICULTURE 
While Brazil and the agriculture sector are facing rising climate risks7, the 
agriculture sector has exacerbated climate change in the Amazon. Brazil makes up the 
biggest share of the Amazon – the world’s largest tropical rainforest, a carbon sink 
providing substantial environmental services not only to Brazil but globally as well. The 
Amazon “has the capacity to absorb up to 2 billion tons of CO2 per year, which corresponds 
 




to about 20 percent of the atmospheric carbon emitted by the burning of fossil fuels.”8 
Notably, deforestation of important biomes has the potential to aggravate climate change 
through lower carbon storage, higher release of carbon dioxide and “changes in rainfall 
patterns.”9 The Brazilian agriculture sector is often linked to devasting deforestation, which 
- coupled with emissions - will have calamitous impacts on the biome and its capacity to 
absorb CO2. Of recent, research is showing that sections of the Amazon are in fact releasing 
more carbon than absorbing and reducing carbon storage.10 Also, “significant increases in 
agricultural GHG emissions have been recorded in Brazil due mainly to the country’s 
substantial beef herd expansion, which has increased methane emissions from enteric 
fermentation, and nitrous oxide emissions through increased manure left on pasture”11 
(Figure 1).  In a global and domestic context where GHG emissions are at all-time highs 
and climate change is accelerating, Brazil’s agriculture sector is a key candidate for 
aggressive enforcement of climate and environmental policy.  
Figure 1: Source of agriculture emissions in Brazil12 
 
 
8 Tigre, M. A. 2019. Building a regional adaptation strategy for Amazon countries. International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 19(4–5): p. 412 
9 de Bolle, M., Weisman, S., Moran, T., Wilcox, D., Hendrix, C., Pisani-Ferry, J., Assunção, J. 2019. 
Policy Brief 19-15: The Amazon Is a Carbon Bomb: How Can Brazil and the World Work Together to 
Avoid Setting It Off? Peterson Institute for International Economics. October: p. 2. 
10 Gatti, Lucinana V., et al. 2021. Amazonia as a carbon source linked to deforestation and climate change. 
Nature, 595: 388–393.  
11 OECD-FAO, 2019, p. 108. 




BRAZIL’S AGRICULTURE SECTOR   
In South America, the agriculture sector has been an important economic and 
political stabilizer, as well as an important global food supplier. Brazil is the top agriculture 
and food trader in Latin America.13 Spanning from forestry to livestock, Brazil’s main 
agriculture products include soybean, sugar cane, ethanol, wheat and processed meat.14 
Historical production and trade trends in the Amazon and Cerrado show significant 
increases in production of soybean and cattle raising.15 Moreover, the Legal Amazon and 
Cerrado (representing over 70% of Brazil’s land area) are the two regions that have 
experienced the highest growth in agriculture. The Brazilian agriculture sector and its 
related services make up just over 21% of the country’s economy16 and contributes to 
approximately 20% of formal employment.17 The sector’s centrality to the economy has 
led to heavy policy support through government programs such as PRONAF (National 
Programme to Strengthen Family Farming – small farmers), PAP (Crop and Livestock Plan 
– medium and large farmers) and PRONAMP (National Programme to Support Medium 
Rural Agricultural Producers).18 The first two program were combined in 2020-2021 to 
form Plano Safra as the primary agriculture credit program with funding announced 
annually.19 This assistance includes credit provisions and development programing such as 
a system of earmarking financial operations (rural credits) and subsidized funds directed at 
 
13 Ibid., p. 108. 
14 Ibid., pp. 76, 88. 
15 Ibid., p. 108. 
16 CEPEA, 2018. 
17 World Bank. 2018. Policy Note: Brazil - Improving the Efficiency of Credit Markets. World Bank - FCI 
GP. August: p. 12 
18 Ibid; Souza, Priscila, Stela Herschmann, Juliano Assunção. 2020. Rural Credit Policy in Brazil: 
Agriculture, Environmental Protection, and Economic Development. Climate Policy Initiative. December: 
p. 18. 




priority sectors, mainly real estate and rural activities.20 Importantly, while policy support 
has stimulated rapid socioeconomic improvements, Brazil’s complex reality has limited 
the effectiveness of these programs.  
For communities surrounding the Amazon and Cerrado, in the North and North-
East of Brazil, agriculture production has contributed to lowering poverty rates and 
improving livelihoods. In line with strong growth, the agriculture sector has contributed 
tremendously to the reduction in rural poverty among agriculture producing families, who 
experienced a halving of extreme poverty rates in a span of ten years.21 On a national level, 
however, Brazil is facing an upward trend in poverty rates and stagnating improvements in 
inequality. Also, the toll climate change has taken on human health in the Amazon and 
Cerrado regions directly affects the population’s ability to attend school and work, thereby 
putting livelihoods at risk: “Amazon firestorms have increased incidence of respiratory 
diseases, crop and infrastructure losses, and forest degradation, when deforestation and 
management fires ignite wildfires.”22 Of note, “Brazil’s public health system (SUS) alone 
had to spend US$ 11 million in health treatment related to respiratory diseases in the 
Amazon region.”23 
The agriculture industry can be linked not only to health problems but also to 
corruption. Brazil consistently ranks above the median of the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption Index24. While corruption is endemic throughout the country, the Amazon’s 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Soares, Sergei, Suarez Dillon, Laeticia Rodrigues de Souza, Wesley Vieira da Silva, Fernando Gaiger da 
Silveira, Áquila Campos. 2016. Poverty profile: The rural North and Northeast of Brazil. International 
Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), Working Paper, No. 138: p. 3.  
22 Silvério, Divino, Silva, S., Alencar, A., & Moutinho, P. 2019. Amazon on Fire. Amazon Environmental 
Research Institute (IPAM): p.1. 
23 Ibid., p. 2 




remoteness as well as heavy presence of criminal organizations and drug trade has further 
contributed to the problem. A high level of local corruption in the Legal Amazon can be 
traced back to pressure from large agriculture producers who challenge land protection and 
enforcement. Mato Grosso, for example, was hit by several scandals linking large 
agriculture producers to local officials in 2008.25 Under similar circumstances, 
Environment Minister Ricardo Salles resigned in June 2021 while facing criminal 
investigations over his role in the illegal logging trade in the Amazon and slowing down 
environmental investigations.26 Strong institutions can shield against corruption and help 
in weeding out structural weaknesses; however, Brazil has consistently ranked poorly in 
global institutional and governance indices including those related to government 
effectiveness and public-sector performance.27 As such, irrespective of  policies, the ability 
to effectively implement is crucial.  
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY28 
Brazil’s early environmental policies were mainly developed to limit deforestation, 
protect forests from depletion through the creation of protected areas and zoning. Mounting 
discourse on the intersection between environmental protection and sustainable 
development also influenced early policies in the 1970’s through industrial zoning and later 
boosted by “the debate on the relation between the environment and sustainable 
 
25 Le Tourneau, François-Michel. 2015. Is Brazil now in control of deforestation in the Amazon? 
(Translated from Le Brésil maîtrise-t-il (enfin) la déforestation en Amazonie?). European Journal of 
Geography. 
26 Brito, Ricardo. 2021. Brazil’s Supreme Court Authorizes Criminal Probe into Environment Minister. 
Reuters. June 21. 
27 World Bank. 2020; Schwab, Klaus. 2019. The Global Competitiveness Report 2019. World Economic 
Forum: pp. 110-111. 




development …[in] the 1990’s.”29 Federal, state and municipal institutions mostly worked 
to reduce pollution and protect and zone land through the establishment of national 
policies, supporting economic growth while considering finite natural resources.30  
During a major wave of neo-liberal economics, Brazil’s environmental agenda 
expanded; it gained public support, advanced climate change performance, and elevated 
Brazil’s status as a global environmental steward. Brazil’s global climate narrative took 
hold in the 1990’s and intensified by the late 2000’s as Brazil was able to curtail rapidly 
rising deforestation rates.31 Brazil’s effort to curb deforestation and related policies rested 
on a critical piece of environmental policy - the Forest Code – leveraging a highly 
successful command-and-control approach. Many institutional and regulatory systems 
were put in place, including black-list mechanisms, the Action Plan for Prevention and 
Control of Brazilian Amazon Deforestation (PPCDAm)32 and the National Policy on 
Climate Change (NPCC). Within the NPCC sit certain sectoral mitigation plans including 
Plano ABC (Plano Agricultura de Baixa Emissão de Carbono (Low-Carbon Agriculture)) 
who’s “objective is to promote the reduction of GHG emissions in agriculture and enable 
the agricultural sector to adapt to climate change.”33 On paper, the Legal Amazon is 
governed by relatively robust environmental policies and laws. However, competing 
 
29 Neves, E. M. S. C. 2016. Institutions and Environmental Governance in Brazil: the Local Governments’ 
Perspective. Revista de Economia Contemporânea, 20(3): p. 495. 
30 Ibid., p. 498 
31 Eduardo, V., and Franchini, M. (2017). Brazil and climate change : Beyond the amazon. ProQuest Ebook 
Central: p. 38. 
32 Since 2004, the PPCDAm was able to reduce deforestation rates significantly. See Appendix 3 for more 
details. 




economic and political interests led to a break with the environmental agenda in the 2010s, 
kickstarted by a change in leadership and, later, an economic crisis.34  
A major turning point was the Forest Code’s reform in 2012. While de Bolle argues 
that the 2012 Forest Code can be viewed as “one of the strictest environmental laws in the 
world,” it nevertheless represented a step back from the 1965 Forest Code. The 2012 
reform ultimately undermined federal power on “environmental control” and relaxed 
“restrictions related to the status of protected areas.”35 Recently, President Bolsonaro’s 
administration (2018-2022) has marked a further shift away from environmental protection 
by appointing “ruralists” linked to the agriculture lobby in key positions and shifted 
responsibility of forest fire monitoring mandates to the Ministry of Agriculture, as 
examples.36   
Continuous years of weak economic growth has also led to a reduction in resources 
funnelled to administrative and monitoring institutions for the environment.37 Highly 
dependent on federal transfers, they now face budgetary and staff cutbacks. To illustrate, 
between 2010 and 2014, allocations to the Environment Ministry totalled 0.4% of federal 
spending – a relatively high amount following a 48% increase during this period.38 These 
allocations were drastically cut in the following years, and they are on a devasting trend. 
In 2021, the Bolsonaro administration cut the Environment Ministry’s budget to 2.1 billion 
reais (0.1% of total public spending), representing a 30% reduction from the previous 
 
34 Eduardo, V., and Franchini, M. 2014. Brazilian climate politics 2005-2012: Ambivalence and paradox. 
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 5(5): p. 679 
35 Neves, 2016, p. 495. 
36 Watts, Jonathan. 2021. Amazon rainforest ‘will collapse if Bolsonaro remains president’. Reuters. July 
14. 
37 de Bolle, 2019. 
38 OECD. 2015. OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Brazil 2015. Organisation for Economic Co-




year’s budget. This cut occurred even though the administration publicly committed to 
finance the enforcement of environmental protection, including ending illegal 
deforestation.39 Still, institutional capacity at all levels of government will continue to 
deteriorate, especially if this funding gap is not plugged. 
Brazil, as a federalist system, delegates most law enforcement and monitoring to 
state and municipal governments and institutions. The benefits of such delegation are 
greater local control over conditions, allowing localities to develop laws and policies 
tailored to their own needs. However, in an already insecure region, when livelihoods are 
put at risk, instability can increase and diminish the effectiveness of environmental policy. 
Limited budgets and capacity, and lack of infrastructure, have greatly reduced the ability 
of local governments to be present in remote areas and address illegal activity, resulting in 
escalating violence and the ensuing environmental impacts. Criminal activity and drug 
trade in the Legal Amazon has also contributed to high levels of violence. Activists and 
civil society are scarcely protected in this context, which limits their effectiveness in 
remote areas. While illegal activity and lack of enforcement have been a persistent 
challenge in the Legal Amazon, the current context is expected to exacerbate the problem.40  
Influenced by weak economic growth limiting the financial capacity of institutions, 
environmental regulations have been relaxed in favour of economically developing the 
Amazon and Cerrado (e.g., mining, forestry and agriculture). This shift has altered Brazil’s 
trajectory towards reducing climate impacts and vulnerabilities. Brazil was successful in 
cutting deforestation rates drastically in the 2000’s through stronger environmental policies 
and leadership; however, policies have proven to be vulnerable to the impulse of the 
 
39 BBC. 2021. Brazil cuts environment budget despite climate summit pledge. BBC. April 24.  




political establishment and insufficient in the face of competing interests. Of note, “an 
extreme focus on short-term considerations and the predominance of fragmented 
interests—…central obstacles for the full development of Brazil as a reformist power in 
international climate governance…Brazil has been unable to complement its huge 
physical–environmental capital with an advanced political–social–environmental 
capital.”41 Domestically, environmental and climate policy are facing an uphill battle under 
Bolsonaro, but international pressure is mounting too.  
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Central to global climate dialogue is the Paris Agreement, which was signed on 4 
November 2016 and came into force in 2020. The Agreement “aims to keep the global 
average temperature rise to ‘well below’ 2°C above pre-industrial levels… [and] limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C.”42 According to the Agreement, the target is firstly achieved 
by reaching peak global GHG emissions as soon as possible, with the goal of achieving 
net-zero emissions by 2050.43 Secondly, signatory countries attest to voluntary climate 
action commitments under the (Intended) Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC/NDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Brazil has an NDC in place, which incorporates Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+).44 Brazilian climate targets have 
incorporated international commitments and are also included in its NPCC. Running in 
parallel, Brazil’s NDC aims to reduce emissions by 37% and 43% below 2005 levels, by 
 
41 Ibid., p. 686. 
42 Gallo, P., and Albrecht, E. 2019. Brazil and the Paris Agreement: REDD+ as an instrument of Brazil’s 
Nationally Determined Contribution compliance. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law 
and Economics, 19(1): p. 124. 
43 Ibid. 




2025 and 2030 respectively. As it stands, Brazil’s NDC is insufficient and inconsistent with 
the Paris Agreement’s objective of limiting global warming to 2°C.45 As such, upping its 
targets and efforts is required to contribute a fair share to climate action. Unfortunately, 
Brazil’s current leadership is unlikely to commit to aggressive action.  
Running counter to the Paris Agreement is the Bolsonaro administration’s approach 
and rhetoric around climate change and environmental protection. Historically, Brazil had 
a strong track record of environmental activism and a relatively engaged civil society, 
particularly amongst lower income Brazilians. By the mid-1990’s, when compared to 
Western European countries, Brazilians were similarly engaged in environmental 
complaints and issues at the local and global level; Brazil also ranked high in group and 
grassroots environmental activism.46 Many believe that the recent uptick in deforestation 
can partially be attributed to the government’s tone on environmental protection and 
climate change. More concretely, President Bolsonaro’s call for the relaxation of 
environmental regulations in favour of developing the Legal Amazon has created a setting 
of leniency. But given the global context, the Brazilian government is in for a tough 
diplomatic fight. The Amazon Fund – mostly funded by Norway – has invested in projects 
to improve monitoring and reducing deforestation in the Amazon since its establishment 
in 2008.47 However, Bolsonaro’s attempts to change the Amazon Fund rules and structure 
led to the halt in funding by Norway and Germany, putting environmental protection efforts 
at risk.48  
 
45 Climate Action Tracker. 2020. Brazil. Climate Action Tracker. 
46 Jacobs, J. (2002). Community Participation, the Environment, and Democracy: Brazil in Comparative 
Perspective. Latin American Politics and Society, 44(4): p.  





As global climate discourse evolves, trade and investment into Brazil is facing 
greater scrutiny. Increasingly, trade negotiations are incorporating climate change and ESG 
considerations. An uncooperative nation may be left out of economically beneficial 
arrangements. For example, mounting opposition to Brazil’s approach on environmental 
issues has weakened the nation’s position in the Mercosur-EU trade agreement 
negotiations. In 2020, the EU halted trade negotiations with Brazil because it opposed 
Bolsonaro’s lack of action in response to deforestation and rapidly spreading wildfires in 
the Amazon49. International cooperation and pressure are proving to be effective 
mechanisms for climate action. Yet, international demand, particularly from China, 
continues to play a significant role in the expansion of Brazil’s agriculture sector. 
International pressure to improve environmental protection and expand climate action is 
gaining traction; however, Brazil’s expanding agriculture trade is countering this trend.  
POLICY ANALYSIS  
Historically, Brazil developed strong environmental policies that were successful 
in significantly addressing deforestation while developing its agriculture sector through 
robust development programs. The Forest Code provides a solid foundation for 
environmental protection policy with various action plans and programs under it. However, 
in the face of economic turmoil and absence of environmental leadership, environmental 
policies are only as strong as their implementation. Starting in the mid-2010’s, economic 
and political interests have gained momentum at the expense of environmental protection. 
This disconnect demonstrates that Brazil has largely developed environmental policy in a 
silo, making it vulnerable to weakening or being overshadowed. As noted by Gallo and 
 
49 Koop, Fermin. 2020. EU parks trade deal with Mercosur over environmental concerns. Buenos Aires 




Albrecht, Brazil’s “institutional design…does not respond to the need of implementing 
complex environmental policies, once the environmental arena affects territorial 
management and requires contributing actions from all levels of government, making its 
implementation more difficult.”50 Moreover, the practical effectiveness of Forest Code 
programs need to evolve. As an example, the PPCDAm and PPCCerrado have done an 
extremely good job at developing data and systems for monitoring bringing visibility and 
quantifies the deforestation problem. However, there doesn’t appear to be thresholds for 
practical action.  
The fragility of institutions and their enforcement capacity, as well as limited 
interconnectedness is restricting the country’s climate action. Research shows that what is 
missing in Brazil’s approach is “policy coherence (referring to policy outputs and 
outcomes) and policy integration (referring to governance arrangements and policymaking 
processes) [to] create a positive interplay enabling the establishment of cross-sector 
mechanisms among governance levels.”51 Also, it is crucial to connect “environmental and 
production policies with social and equity concerns.”52 In agriculture, Brazil has struggled 
to structurally engrain environmental protection policies into sustainable agriculture 
development policy. For example, Plano ABC is only a small fraction of Plano Safra when 
it could integrate its sustainability and conservation measures into all agriculture credits 
provided by financial institutions. Moreover, funding options are complex and difficult to 
navigate making them harder to access for smaller farmers.  
 
50 Gallo and Albrecht, 2019, p. 131. 
51 Gallo and Albrecht, 2019, p. 132. 
52 Milhorance, C., and Bursztyn, M. 2019. Climate adaptation and policy conflicts in the Brazilian Amazon: 




Up until now, Brazil has developed and implemented anti-deforestation policies, 
making up much of the country’s climate policy, but a siloed approach to environmental 
policy and agriculture development has thwarted those efforts. As agriculture opportunities 
expand, it is critical to strengthen institutions to ensure effective implementation of policy. 
The more environmental policy is viewed holistically and integrated into the suite of 
economic policies, the less susceptible it is to political whim and influence from competing 
interests. For the agriculture sector, engraining environmental policy into equitable 
development programs and strategies requires incentives and partnerships supported by 
strong leadership. 
HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
The main hypothesis to be tested is that weak institutionalization and enforcement 
of environmental protection policy in Brazil has allowed for increasing deforestation as 
agricultural development has increased. This paper will aim to address this hierarchy of 
needs by assessing Brazil’s institutions, policies, and trends in agriculture development and 
by demonstrating that actions taken by the Brazilian government counter the image of 
progressive environmental policy developed in the 1990’s to mid-2010’s. This policy 
research study will leverage multi-methods, incorporating a case study of Brazil along with 
quantitative analysis. The case study will be a historical assessment of two focus areas and 
their evolution through time: environmental and climate policy and agriculture production 
and trade. While not the focus of this paper, issues related to socioeconomic security in 
agriculture producing areas will be explored given the implications on competing interests 




The case study will incorporate time series analysis of agriculture production and 
trade, emissions and deforestation rates nationally and by state (when available) to support 
the historical accounts of climate and environment, economic development, finance policy 
in Brazil. Most data are pulled from official sources including Brazilian federal agencies 
and state governments; multilateral agencies (e.g., United Nations and World Bank); and 
organizations and academics with expertise (e.g., Peterson Institute, IPAM). To test if the 
hypothesis is correct, data will be used to show a demonstrable deterioration in 
environmental policy enforcement and rising deforestation rates related to agriculture 
development. Reduction in deforestation was possible during a period of rising agriculture 
production and trade; however, it is when leadership and policy shifted, and more 
importantly enforcement, that we start to see degradation in environmental protection and 
climate policy.  
DATA 
 This section will address institutional and policy gaps in environmental and climate 
policy. Next, it will present trends in agriculture and trade indicators in conjunction with 
climate related data, including emissions and deforestation; it will also discuss trends in 
sustainable development, including finance programs. To set the stage, a timeline will 
outline key events. 
TIMELINE 
 Historically, Brazil has been a global environmental steward; but today, it is facing 
rising deforestation, putting into question its approach to environmental and climate policy. 
Brazil pioneered deforestation policy through various environmental protection legislation, 




Brazil did not concurrently institutionalize these policies throughout government and 
economic sectors, thereby weakening the ability to implement and enforce. Over time, 
competing interests, strong demand and incentives to rapidly expand agriculture trade 
undermined the government’s ability to manage deforestation (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Timeline of Key Events 
 
INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES53  
Brazil has a relatively advanced foundation for environmental protection 
contributing to climate policy, starting with the constitution. As mentioned, Brazil boasts 
an internationally recognized Forest Code, which is the basis of its national policy. By the 
time a new Brazilian constitution was in place in 1988, a national framework had already 
been established to manage the environment through mandates and principles. For instance, 
the constitution declared the “inclusion of the environment as a diffuse and collective 
interest under the responsibility of public prosecutors54 [who assumed] responsibility for 
environmental regulation enforcement, particularly through civil lawsuits against 
offenders…; and the establishment of the principle of strict liability.”55 This constitutional 
 
53 While environmental and climate policy is more expansive, this section will focus on governance related 
to deforestation and areas such as water, energy and pollution management are out of scope for this paper. 
54 Ministério Público or Federal Public Ministry 




inclusion was further strengthened through the understanding of a “shared [and 
comparable] responsibility among the federal, state and municipal levels” and coupling 
environmental issues with economic and social development.56 By the early 1990s, Brazil 
had gradually improved its institutional and governance framework, buoyed by the global 
environmental agenda. The agenda was centered around accountability for “environmental 
degradation [which] was correlated to unsustainable patterns of production and 
consumption, poverty, urbanization, and international trade.”57 In Brazil, several 
regulations and legislations were established such as the Environmental Crimes Law of 
1998 and rules related to environmentally protected areas and education.58 By the turn of 
the 21st century, Brazil was a recognised environmental guardian domestically and 
internationally.  
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP 
As a federal state, Brazil’s governance structure incorporates three levels of 
government: federal, state, and municipal. The federal government leads on international 
commitments and national policy, and state and municipal institutions translate them to the 
local context. Much of Brazil’s institutional governance is linked to the 2009 NPCC and 
its Forest Code, featuring several ministries59 (Figure 3). Through the development of 
environmental institutions, regulations and frameworks, the focus increasingly became 
curbing deforestation under the highly successful leadership of a Ministry of Environment 
 
56 Ibid., pp. 499-500 
57 Ibid., p. 501 
58 Ibid. 
59 Most relevant to this paper: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), Ministry of Science, Technology, 
Innovation and Communication (MCTIC), Ministry of Environment (MMA) and Ministry of Agriculture 




(MMA) led by Minister Marina Silva60 (2003-2008). Supported by former President Lula 
da Silva, Silva’s MMA forged an instrumental alliance between Lula’s party, the PT, and 
environmental groups boosting public awareness of deforestation and promoting 
Figure 3 - Brazilian Institutions Responsible for Forest Policy61 
 
collaboration amongst stakeholders.62 The ministry benefitted significantly from its 
growing influence domestically, thanks to its success in reducing deforestation while 
supporting development in ethanol and hydropower, for example. Furthermore, 
international climate policy boosted its profile.63 During this period, deforestation targets 
in forest policy, namely the Forest Code, contributed to GHG emission reduction. A 
command-and-control approach to forest management, monitoring and protection became 
a core mechanism for climate policy. By 2007, deforestation rates and agriculture prices 
(which stimulated production) decoupled, demonstrating that sustainable development 
 
60 Silva resigned in 2008 due to tensions with competing interests and growing rift between Silva and Lula. 
Silva was replaced in Carlos Minc. Phillips, Tom (2009). Brazil's former environment minister leaves 
ruling party over 'destruction of natural resources'. The Guardian. August 19 2009. 
61 Gallo and Albrecht, 2019, p. 126 
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without rising deforestation was possible, but not without strong leadership and 
collaboration.   
Federal politics is also heavily influenced by the Brazilian Congress. Brazil 
functions under a coalition system of government with representation from over 30 parties. 
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a single party can hold a majority, making coalitions 
necessary for policymaking. Since Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985, dependence on 
coalitions has contributed to a highly fragmented system, influenced by vested interests 
(namely agriculture, energy, and industry) and dominated by pork barrel politics related to 
the BBB coalition (Beef for agriculture, Bible for evangelical Christians, and Bullets for 
gun-rights). As mentioned, short-term considerations and economic interests can thwart 
decision-making and impact the government’s approach to environmental concerns.   
FOREST CODE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY64 
The Forest Code sets parameters for deforestation and reforestation. Specifically, it 
obliges landowners to maintain a minimum portion of permanent forest cover: 80% in the 
Amazon and 20% on other lands.65 Also, “the Brazilian NDC pledges to compensate for 
‘legal suppression of vegetation’.”66 The Forest Code has also provided a framework for 
farmers to receive technical and financial support from private sector, civil society and 
international organizations such as the Amazon Fund, German bank KfW and Mato Grosso 
Agribusiness Federation (FAMATO) in navigating various mechanisms including the 
 
64 Further details provided in Appendix 3.  
65 Milhorance, C., and Bursztyn, M, 2019. p. 224. 




Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA).67 A market for forest compensation and offsets is 
developing but it is disjointed and the laws regulating compensation are outdated.68 
As part of its NPCC, Brazil has set various objectives that aim to improve forest 
management to reduce deforestation and climate change impact. Of note, the PPCDAm 
outlines eight specific objectives, such as integrating “fire management with a view to 
reduce forest fires that are harmful to biodiversity” through developing various 
programmes and plans as well as increasing personnel capacity.69 Other objectives touch 
on improving real-time data management and collection, promoting forest concessions, 
and expanding access to credit for sustainable forest management measures.70  
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Having ministerial institutions and mandates in place is only part of the equation. 
Brazilian institutions are often characterized by their heavy bureaucracy and complexity, 
making coordination across government challenging. Policy needs to be translated into 
direct action and measures. Unfortunately, environmental protection and climate policy 
implementation face several barriers, most of which grew evident in the early to mid-2010s 
when more robust domestic plans and international agreements were enacted (e.g., REDD+ 
and Paris Agreement). Gallo and Albrecht summarize the key obstacles: “(1) problems in 
design and planning, (2) transparency, (3) difficulties of coordination between institutions, 
(4) lack of budgetary resources and qualified personnel, (5) failure in the use of credit lines 
created for sustainable production and (6) low capacity of technology transfer.”71  
 
67 Milhorance and Bursztyn, 2019, pp. 223-224. 
68 Lopes, Cristina Leme, Julia Nardi and Joana Chiavari. 2021. Regulating Forest Compensation for Legal 
Deforestation in Brazil. Climate Action Initiative. August 3.  
69 UNFCCC. 2019. Brazil’s Third Biennial Update Report to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). p. 25 
70 UNFCCC, 2019, p. 7-9. 




The MMA has been confronted with Brazil’s fragmented political environment 
limiting its effectiveness. Moreover, single person dependence was (and is) relatively high 
in Brazil; once Silva left office, the public lost its symbol of environmental guardianship 
and the environmental movement suffered.72 By the time Izabella Texeira took over the 
helm at MMA in 2011 and Silva was decisively out of federal politics, the MMA’s political 
influence had dwindled. Under President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), the MMA shifted 
to a more economically conservative position, supported the Forest Code’s reform in 
opposition to environmentalists and broke the alliance between environmentalists and the 
PT party in 2012.73 The rift widened as the country entered one of its most challenging 
economic periods, leading to the impeachment of Rousseff and the Lava Jato scandal.74 
Without an environmental leader such as Silva, priorities shifted, and the environmental 
and climate agenda fell out of favour, replaced by economic concerns. As the leading and 
coordinating body, the MMA should have addressed these barriers; however, it has not 
proved effective.75  
Today, these challenges continue and governmental ineffectiveness stalls progress 
on major policy needs, including climate. Under the current administration, Bolsonaro 
named Tereza Cristina Diaz as Brazil’s agriculture minister; Diaz is a known pro-
agribusiness “ruralist”, closely aligned with the Beef coalition, and she has signaled 
intentions to expand commercial farming on protected indigenous lands.76 Brazil has built 
 
72 Eduardo and Franchini, 2014, p. 685. 
73 Ibid., p. 683-685. 
74 Corruption investigations centered on the payment of bribes through overpayment of infrastructure 
projects and contracts through Petrobras, Brazil’s government owned oil and gas company.  
75 Gallo and Albrecht, 2019, pp. 128-129. 
76 Webb, Hannah and Raquel Nunes Palmeira. 2018. Bolsonaro: Trump of the tropics. Socialist Lawyer, 
No. 80 (October), p. 21; Spring, Jake, and Anthony Boadle. 2019. Brazil agriculture minister wants to open 




up an international reputation for institutionally developing delegations of authority to 
support environmental protection and climate policy; however, competing interests fight 
against these authorities.  
COMPETING PRIORITIES 
Compounding the barriers of heavy bureaucracy are limited collaboration and 
dialogue amongst key stakeholders, conflicting priorities, and corruption. The absence “of 
dialogue with civil society, federal states and mainly indigenous and traditional 
communities” adds to the lack of “coordination and compatibility among the NPCC, 
environmental policies and development goals.”77 Further, “the difficulties to get the 
projects financed, promoting a mismatch between the resources available and the 
disbursement to support projects,” results in “marginalising indigenous, small landowners 
and forest communities, and neglecting their chance to get projects supported.”78 
Competing priorities between international commitments and federal and state direction 
are also limiting support for projects.79  
While Brazil had maintained a positive image in terms of the international climate 
change agenda prior to Bolsonaro, policymaking and enforcement has veered in the other 
direction.80 Specifically, agribusiness, transportation and energy sectors have played the 
biggest roles in lobbying the legislature and executive to relax regulations to develop 
projects. Gallo and Albrecht posit that numerous legislative and constitutional proposals 
have been brought forward to the National Congress aiming to relax “regulations on large-
scale projects such as mining, hydropower dams and road building, and expansion of 
 
77 Gallo and Albrecht, 2019, p. 132. 
78 Ibid., p. 130. 
79 Ibid. 




agriculture activities.” Constitutional Amendment (PEC) 65, for example, “facilitate[d] 
licensing for large-scale infrastructure projects without evaluation and mitigation of 
environmental impacts”; and as a result, it will severely threaten forests and 
“cause…extensive environmental damage.”81  
The NDC outlines specific targets aligned with these competing interest sectors; 
however, there appears to be limited coordination between the development of these 
opportunities.  The view of the agribusiness sector is that the climate change narrative is 
“a threat to the expansion of the sector, which relies heavily on the use of freshwater, soil, 
chemicals, and fertilizers…[and] has also been a beneficiary of illegal deforestation.”82 As 
such, rural and informal financial credits are provided to promote agriculture activity 
without the requirement to address climate impacts. For example, the ethanol sector has 
been key to stimulating agriculture activity and investment. Brazil is a global leader in flex-
fuel technology that allows automobiles to switch between ethanol and fossil fuel. In 2006 
President Lula introduced the “so-called ‘Ethanol Diplomacy’…aiming to constitute a 
global economy for Brazilian biofuels,” and by 2007 Brazil announced a partnership with 
the United States to develop the market.83 While deforestation rates had declined, ethanol 
diplomacy came at a time when the political anti-deforestation movement was losing 
ground.  
Finally, trade has also fueled the conflict between agriculture production and 
climate diplomacy, as evident in the relationship between Brazil and China. Due to its sheer 
size, China is one of the world’s most important food importers, and Brazil has become a 
 
81 Gallo and Albrecht, 2019, p. 136. 
82 Eduardo and Franchini, 2014, p. 679. 




key supplier. The Brazil-China Bilateral Trade Agreement was signed in 1978 at a time 
when China was reintegrating into the global economy, aided by Brazil’s support for its 
World Trade Organization membership. Under the administrations of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1995–2003) and Lula (2003–2011), Brazil developed into a global trader and 
China became one of its main customers.84 By 2009 China was Brazil’s main trading 
partner, and by 2019 it accounted for 29% of total exports, with soybeans and processed 
meat making up the largest share.85 From 2009 to 2019, Brazilian shipments to China grew 
by 12% CAGR, with soybeans and processed meat products making up almost 40% of 
exports by 2019.86 To meet this rising demand from China, Brazil’s soybean and meat 
production expanded, encouraging substantial investment in Brazil.  
Through China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative, the Brazil-China Fund (launched 
in 2017) established “a mechanism to finance projects of common interest in infrastructure, 
logistics, energy, mining, and agribusiness, among others.”87 The agriculture sector’s 
promotion through trade and investment has likely influenced rising deforestation rates in 
the past 10 years, limiting climate adaptation capacity. Broader foreign policy could be 
further stimulating Brazil’s agricultural growth. China has expanded its climate action and 
integrated some climate policy into its long-term economic planning; however, it has 
predominantly focused on energy and technology innovation rather than a holistic climate 
action plan.88 As China increasingly replaced the US and became Brazil’s top trading 
partner, economic considerations overshadowed climate discourse. China and Brazil 
 
84 Vieira, V. R. 2014. Is politics behind trade? The impact of international trends and diplomatic action on 
Brazil’s exports during globalisation. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 33(2): p. 140. 
85 UN, 2019. 
86 UN, 2019. 
87 Péra et al., 2019, p. 400. 
88 Leiteritz, Ralf J. 2013. Changing Weather: China’s Role in Latin America’s Climate Change Policy. 




reinforced the view that development would be at risk if aggressive climate action was 
taken, in line with the Brazilian agriculture lobby but in opposition to the US view.89 
Overall, domestic and international environmental and climate policy have taken a turn in 
Brazil. 
AGRICULTURE AND CLIMATE DATA90 
While agriculture production occurs throughout the country, concentrations of 
production and establishments differ by area. The North-East makes up over 45% of 
farming establishments in Brazil. Over half are small establishments (<0.1 ha), with 
establishments in Mato Grosso and Minas Gerais holding the largest agriculture areas in 
the country.91 In terms of larger establishments (>1,000 ha), Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do 
Sul and Pará make up over 45% of the total. Despite Mato Grosso accounting for only 2% 
of farms, they hold over 15% of the country’s agriculture production area. Much of the 
growth in establishments is attributed to two Amazon States: Pará and Mato Grosso.92 
Overall, in terms of farm establishments, the most important states in the Amazon and 
Cerrado are Bahia, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and Pará.  
Within the Amazon and Cerrado, eight states (Figure 4) make up 60% of total 
cropland.93 The agriculture sector is diverse but nonetheless dominated by soybean and 
 
89 Ibid., p. 340. 
90 Given their importance, soybean and beef will be used as proxies for agriculture development. Moreover, 
Brazil’s deforestation data follows a reference calendar of August to July; however, for the purposes of this 
study and comparability, data will be set to a calendar year except for in-text notations on deforestation 
trends.  
91 IBGE. 2017. Census of Agriculture. Tabela 6754 - Número de estabelecimentos agropecuários e Área 
dos estabelecimentos agropecuários, por tipologia, condição legal das terras, grupos de atividade 
econômica e grupos de área total. Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Original data heading is “agriculture area” defined by IBGE as land used to produce food, fibres, and 
other raw materials. While generally agriculture area includes livestock rearing, IBGE disaggregates 
livestock from agriculture area; therefore, data will be labelled as cropland rather than agriculture area. 





beef. Of Brazil’s 27 states, 16 count soybeans as 1/3 of all planted area, eight of which 
count soybean as more than half.94 At the state level, Mato Grosso’s planted area is over 
20% of Brazil’s total, with soybean reaching almost 60% and growing 5% CAGR since 
2010.95 Mato Grosso is the largest soybean producer in Brazil, followed by Paraná96 
(Figure 5).  
Figure 4: Use of Land - Cropland97 
 
Figure 5: Planted Area98 
 
Cattle raising and pastureland follows similar trends in that major Amazon and 
Cerrado states make up a large portion of the area; but unlike cropland, pastureland has 
 




97 IBGE, 2018. 
98 IBGE, 2020. 









































































































remained relatively stable since 2010 in its land use growth (the exception being 
Rondônia).  
Figure 6: Use of Land – Managed Pasture Area99 
 
To summarize, within the Amazon and Cerrado, there are key states that are 
historically important for crop and pastureland areas including Mato Grosso, Pará and 
Goiás. That said, other, smaller states have grown significantly over the last 20 to 30 years 
with implications for deforestation (Table 1). Supply has been a key element of 
deforestation trends; however, rapid demand growth is also important to consider. 
Table 1: Compounded Annual Growth Rate100 
  Cropland Area Managed Pasture Area 
  2000-2010 2010-2018 2018 Share 2000-2010 2010-2018 2018 Share 
Mato Grosso 3% 3% 18% 3% 0% 17% 
Paraná 1% 0% 11% 0% 0% 2% 
Goiás 2% 2% 10% 1% 0% 14% 
Minas Girais 3% 2% 8% 0% 0% 10% 
Mato Grosso do Sul 1% 4% 7% 0% -1% 13% 
Bahia 4% 3% 5% 1% 1% 5% 
Pará 10% 16% 1% 7% 1% 14% 
Rondônia 3% 9% 1% 5% 2% 6% 
Total Brazil 2% 2% -- 2% 0% -- 
Brazilian producers have taken advantage of rapidly rising soybean prices not only 
during the commodity supercycle of the 2000s but more recently as well (Table 2). Exports 
 
99 IBGE, 2018. 
100 IBGE, 2018. 












multiplied more than six-fold between 1989 and 2019, in part because of the agriculture 
and agri-food industry, which now makes up 35% of total exports.101 Soybeans and 
processed meat shipments multiplied by three and seven-fold within the same period, 
respectively, contributing to about half of agriculture and agri-food exports.102 One view is 
that growth in Brazil’s agriculture production, and related economic benefits, will partly 
depend on expanding into “new agriculture land.”103 And yet, that may not be necessary 
nor is it sustainable. Brazil was able to grow soybean and beef production during periods 
when deforestation rates steeply declined, particularly during the commodity boom, in part 
driven by yield increases (Table 2). Also, it is estimated that a depleted rainforest could 
represent up to US$8bn of annual economic revenue lost from tree-related activities that 
would require a preserved rainforest (e.g., harvesting nuts).104 Agriculture development 
need not contribute to deforestation, and there can be economic benefits to reducing it.
 
101 UN. 2020. UN Comtrade. United Nations – Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
102 Ibid. 
103 OECD-FAO, 2019, p. 129. 




Table 2: Key Indicators105 






19,419   38,432   55,027   75,324   95,435  114,075  119,282  115,030  120,620  122,585  5% 6% 
Exports 
(Thous.Tonnes) 
 3,736   16,219   24,020   33,301   50,307   67,549   72,939   65,247   71,940   72,957  8% 8% 
Area Harvested 
(Thous.Hectares) 
 9,617   13,970   22,749   24,181   33,252   33,909   35,149   35,874   36,678   36,998  2% 5% 
Yield (Tonne/Hectare)  2.0   2.8   2.4   3.1   2.9   3.4   3.4   3.2   3.3   3.3  3% 1% 
Brazil Soybean Prices 
(Paraná State: US$/60Kg 
Bag) 
-- 10.5 12.9 22.8 20.6 22.3 20.8 21.5 19.0 25.9 5% 5% 
Beef and Veal Production 
(Thous.Tonnes) 
 4,317   6,540   9,174   8,731   8,528   8,716   8,923   9,215   9,276   9,328  2% 2% 
Exports 
(Thous.Tonnes) 
 122   313   1,306   1,399   1,280   1,286   1,430   1,689   1,711   1,953  9% 10% 
Cow Inventory (Thous)  41,664   40,956   47,749   51,845   54,210   55,025   55,850   58,080   57,200   58,717  2% 2% 
GHG Emissions - 
Agriculture (Mil. Metric 
Tons CO2e) 
 340   380   468   491   497   503   507   496   --   --  0% 6% 
Deforestation - Legal 
Amazon (km2) 
13,730 18,226 19,014 5,820 5,814 7,005 6,671 7,033 10,666 10,313 12% -3% 
Deforestation – Cerrado 
(km2) 
-- -- 17,613 9,994 11,675 6,790 7,312 6,634 6,483 7,340 -9% -- 
 




EMISSIONS AND DEFORESTATION 
Brazil’s climate policy and emissions reduction targets are closely linked to 
deforestation. Brazil’s annual GHG emissions in 2017 reached 3.6 MtCO2e per capita, and 
in 2016, more than 500 MtCO2e (over 30% of total) could be attributed to the agriculture 
sector, topping the sector rankings.106 Land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) 
accounted for around 60% of total emissions in 1990, dropping to its historical low of 20% 
by 2014 before rising again and settling at 27% in 2018.107 As shown in Figure 7, Brazil’s 
emissions reduction accelerated between 2004 and 2009; however, since 2010, Brazil’s 
emissions reductions have stalled. Notwithstanding an insufficiently aggressive NDC, 
Brazil is on track to meet its emissions reduction targets as they include LULUCF.108 At 
risk is Brazil’s NDC deforestation target, which consists of: “1) zero illegal deforestation 
in the Brazilian Amazonia; 2) restoring and reforesting 12 million ha of forests by 2030; 
[and] 3) enhancing sustainable native forest management.”109 Without consistently 
reducing forest cover loss, Brazil is at risk of undoing vital climate action.   
Figure 7: Greenhouse Gas Emissions including LULUCF – Historical and Target110 
 
 
106 Ritchie, Hannah and Max Roser. 2017. CO₂ and Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Our World in Data. 
107 Climate Action Tracker, 2020. 
108 While out of scope for this study, it is important to note that, generally, Paris Agreement NDC targets 
exclude LULUCF. However, in Brazil, they were included likely due to its importance and, as seen in 



























































































































Emissions related to agriculture come from several avenues. Deforestation in Brazil 
contributed to a 2-5% increase in global carbon dioxide emissions on an annual basis 
between 1996 and 2005.111 The use of fertilizer is necessary to improve yields and 
production, but its over- and misuse can increase not only the emission of nitrogen gas but 
also the contamination of water supply, putting biodiversity and food security at risk.112 
Transportation also contributes to rising emissions. Brazil exported approximately 77 
million tons of soybean in 2018. Using Péra et al.’s assumptions that each ton amounts to 
130.55 kg of CO2 in transportation emissions, the movement of soybean exports 
contributed about 10 MtCO2 to a total of 464 MtCO2 produced in Brazil.
113 Assessing 
emissions throughout the entire agriculture supply chain would greatly improve Brazil’s 
emissions reduction; however, there remains limited action around agriculture emissions 
outside of deforestation.  
In the Amazonian states, emissions have fallen significantly from the highs of the 
2000s, with Mato Grosso, Pará and Rondônia leading the reductions. By 2012, in line with 
the policy efforts mentioned, emissions dropped substantially. Unfortunately, those trends 
have started to reverse (Figure 8).  




111 Magrin et al, 2014, pp. 1522 
112 Porter et al, 2014, pp. 164, 285 
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As noted, Brazil’s climate policy is highly centred around limiting deforestation. 
Combining climate vulnerability with rising emissions could exacerbate vulnerable 
conditions and increase the need to actively manage deforestation. Since its introduction in 
2004, PPCDAm115 was able to reduce deforestation rates significantly (Figure 9). Despite 
aggressive targets set in 2009, the country is once again experiencing a swift jump in 
deforestation. Specifically, the resurgence of deforestation reflects the unsustainably rapid 
rates of agriculture expansion in the Brazilian Amazon and Cerrado, in part because of 
illegal activity and lack of enforcement.116  
Figure 9: Annual Deforestation Rates in Amazon and Cerrado117 
 
Brazil’s North-East is particularly vulnerable to land degradation driven by climate 
change and human actions, including mismanagement of resources and deforestation.118 
Cumulative deforestation has devastated two of the most important agriculture producing 
states, where significant attention is being paid to sustainable agriculture: Pará and Mato 
 
115 The Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Brazilian Amazon Deforestation tracks deforestation 
rates. (The tracking was made possible through the partnership between NASA and Brazil’s National 
Institute for Space Research (INPE) and the creation of the Real Time Detection of Deforestation (DETER) 
– satellite tracking and monitoring. Data is transmitted to the Brazilian Institute of Environment and 
Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA). INPE and IBAMA are the main Brazilian institutions involved in 
environmental and climate related endeavours. 
116 de Bolle, 2019, p. 6. 
117 PRODES (2021). Deforestation Rates. TerraBrasilis (Deforestation). Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas 
Espaciais. 















































































Grosso (Figure 10). Moreover, impacts are expanding into other biomes, including the 
wetlands of Pantanal, in part through a doubling of forest fires in 2020 relative to 2019.119  
Figure 10: Total Deforested Area by State (km²)120 
 
While some deforestation may be attributed to natural causes, man-made fires and 
slash and burn practices are increasingly common for rapid land clearance.121 Also, climate 
change and rising temperatures increase water stress, lead to droughts and drier conditions, 
and potentially further contribute to forest fires.122 Deforestation rates increased by 30% in 
the Legal Amazon in 2019 when Brazil faced one of its harshest burning seasons in recent 
history.123 Despite assumptions that an unusually dry season led to the 2019 wildfire, 
deforestation was the predominant driver.124 In 2020, Brazil’s Amazon and Cerrado 
experienced another devastating year (Figure 11). Importantly, forest fires have the 
potential to rejuvenate soil; however, when done incorrectly and without the appropriate 
 
119 Wenzel, Fernanda, Naira Hofmeister, Pedro Papini. 2021. Demand for soy puts pressure on Pantanal, 
Brazil’s largest wild wetland. MONGABAY. June 23; DETER, 2021.  
120 PRODES, 2021.  
121 de Bolle, 2019 
122 Andreoni, Manuela and Ernesto Londoño. 2021. Brazil, Besieged by Covid, Now Faces a Severe 
Drought. New York Times, June 19. 
123 PRODES, 2021. 
124 Alencar, Ane, Paulo Moutinho, Vera Arruda, Camila Balzani and João Ribeiro. 2019. Amazon Burning: 
Locating the Fires: Technical Memo from the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM). Amazon 
Environmental Research Institute (IPAM). September. p. 7 





























knowledge and tools, they can counteract sustainable agriculture and, in turn, climate 
adaptation. Ideally, “slash and burn” agriculture should be limited to smaller scale 
production in lower-density environments because of the soil’s need to regenerate.125 
However, the rapidly expanding agriculture industry is contributing to an unsustainable 
escalation of the practice.  
Figure 11: Monthly Forest Fires in Brazil (1999-2020)126 
 
Another important signal that deforestation is not require for agriculture development is 
the substantial amount of degraded land – some of which could be rejuvenated and used 
for various activities (Figure 12). Brazilian company Suzano Pulp and Paper, for example, 
only plant on anthropogenically degraded land for its eucalyptus production and 
reforestation efforts. Despite the potential, there appear to be barriers to knowledge sharing 
and capacity building in terms of agriculture practices. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) notes the heavy lifting required from the agriculture sector in 
eliminating deforestation by 2020, stating that either livestock production would have to 
drop by 26-40% by 2050 or average livestock density would need to double “from 0.74 to 
1.46 head per hectare.”127 While not entirely impossible, accomplishing these targets would 
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require a significant shift in agriculture production practices. Agriculture production and 
trade, emissions reduction and deforestation limitations have had concurrent success in 
Brazil; however, policy implementation and taking a holistic approach must be central to 
climate action and environmental protection to sustain that success. 
Figure 12: Cumulative Deforestation Notices by Legal Amazon State and Class  
(Aug 2015 - Dec 2020)128 
 
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT129 
The Paris Agreement’s objective is to “enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen 
resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change. All Parties are required to engage in 
adaptation planning processes, such as National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), as well as in the 
implementation of adaptation actions (art. 7.9).”130 For Brazil, its NAP lies within its 
NPCC and “brings together existing sectorial strategies which are considered relevant to 
the climate adaptation objectives” as it relates to land use and change.131  
Brazil has developed a wide array of mitigating and adaptive measures within the 
IPCC’s parameters. During periods of rapid agriculture expansion, namely mid-1990’s to 
2000’s, the government promoted crop productivity (e.g., electrification leading to 
 
128 Deter, 2021. 
129 Further details provided in Appendix 3. 
130 Tigre, 2019, p. 412 
131 Milhorance and Bursztyn, 2019, p. 218-222 














improved storage and irrigation capacity), technological improvements and heard 
density.132 Moreover, Brazil boasts an internationally recognized reputation for developing 
adaptive technologies - such as GMO soybeans - allowing Brazil to expand its production 
in areas that would otherwise be inhospitable. As part of the NPCC and NAP, other 
practices were introduced in the 2000s; and in 2010, Plano (Plan) ABC launched and 
became core to the agriculture sector’s response to climate change. Plano ABC is 
comprised of seven programmes: “namely recovery of degraded pastures, integration of 
crop-livestock-forest and agroforestry systems, no-tillage system, biological nitrogen 
fixation, planted forests, animal waste and adaptation to climate change.”133 
Complementing the ABC plan are PPCDAm and PPCerrado, with a central objective 
related to deforestation. As part of the ABC Plan, the objective “is to improve efficiency 
in the use of natural resources, increase the resilience of production systems and rural 
communities, and allow the adaptation of the agricultural sector to climate change.” 
Nevertheless, the success of the ABC Plan faces numerous obstacles including absence of 
direction, monitoring capacity and limited financial resources.134 Also, it does not shield 
against illegal deforestation. 
Brazil’s size, geography, development levels and economic structure result in an 
exceptionally complex context, which is further challenged by climate change. Challenging 
sustainable development are Brazil’s persistent security issues, such as comparatively high 
levels of criminal activity and violence.135 Limited opportunities for employment outside 
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of mining and agriculture increases the likelihood of turning to criminality for subsistence. 
Also, the Legal Amazon has been an especially challenging context for environmental and 
social protection activists, as well as non-titled land holders. Violent land disputes are a 
persistent problem in Brazil.136 Most of the country’s land disputes occur in the Legal 
Amazon.137 “Squatters and invadors” are also very active in the Amazon, responsible for 
most illegal resource cultivation.138 Of note, there is a growing link between squatters and 
invaders, and criminal organizations. Economic development has not only created 
“opportunities to legal deforestation, but also reduce[d] protected areas in rural 
properties…This shows how the legal and political arena in Brazil promotes the expansion 
of the agricultural frontier and the occupation of forestlands.”139 In this context of 
competing interests, remote areas are more often those facing higher rates of deforestation 
and receive the least support for adaptation.  
FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES140 
Domestic channels for environmental and sustainable agriculture-linked credits are 
limited and complex reducing incentives to incorporate sustainable practices and actively 
contribute to climate targets.141 As it stands, areas most affected by climate change and 
environmental degradation (North and North-East) are less integrated into the Brazilian 
financial system and have limited financial support to develop sustainable agriculture 
practices. Crop insurance is providing some reprieve, but adaptation requires funding.  
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Through a system of earmarking financial operations, subsidized funds are directed 
at priority sectors, mainly real estate and rural activities.142 However, rural credits make up 
a mere 5% of total credit in Brazil.143 Most earmarked rural credits go to farmers, but it is 
predominantly funnelled to the more developed South and Central-West regions of Brazil. 
This imbalance is in part due to environmental and land tenure challenges, most prevalent 
in the North and North-East of Brazil.144 Connecting CAR (Rural Environmental Registry) 
with rural credit was a way to integrate, and possibly promote, environmental and 
agricultural policies in the Amazon region. However, it is challenging to assure “the 
effectiveness of this measure and promot[e] change in agricultural practices among all 
categories of producers.”145 For instance, ABC related credit lines, which promote climate 
mitigation and combat deforestation, make up less than 2% of the total rural credit, limiting 
the amount of credit available to priority areas in the Amazon.146  
Sustainable agriculture promotion through “the low-carbon agriculture plan has 
offered financing for sustainable practices, but Brazilian farmers have not yet shown much 
inclination to take these loans.”147 One explanation for the lack of uptake is that “the 
progressive growth of the ABC interest rates, coupled with a low investment economic 
environment, negatively impacted the volume of disbursements, which was already 
insufficient, making the credit line uncompetitive in relation to traditional rural credit 
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them relatively uncompetitive related to traditional financing.149 Lastly, the complexity of 
the funding options can be difficult to navigate. There are more than ten loan programs, 
bound by specific rules, with an approximately equal number of diverse lending sources 
with their own rules.150 
Smaller scale farmers are in fact disadvantaged within this framework. In terms of 
scale of emissions reduction, smaller farms cannot compete with the reduction amounts of 
medium- and large-sized agriculture producers. Therefore, the smaller and family farms 
are more so supported through other programs, such as green credit lines from PRONAF, 
or more recently Plano Safra.151 Again, while these establishments have access, the issue 
is scale: “major challenges remain in scaling-up access to credit that favours a change in 
agricultural practices, particularly that accessible to family farmers.”152 Technical 
requirements are indeed important; however, capacity building requires capital.  
Central to climate finance and investment related to deforestation has been the 
REDD+ or ENREDD+ (Brazil’s National Strategy on REDD+ established in 2013)153, 
which provide the financial infrastructure to address deforestation and forest 
preservation.154 Its main objective is to “mitigate GHG emissions by eliminating illegal 
deforestation, delivering environmental and co-benefits and promoting…the development 
of a low-carbon economy.”155 However, much like other programs, its effectiveness 
remains a question: “the total REDD+ investment has been 70 times smaller than the 
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subsidies provided to the agricultural sector in Brazil” and point to “the struggle of distinct 
but at the same time competing and coexistent discourses.”156 
Policies are in place, but institutions are weak. Command-and-control has worked 
in the past but incentives to continue this path are few. The economy needs to develop but 
options are sometimes limited, particularly in rural, remote areas such as the Amazon. 
Much like economic, environmental and climate policy needs to evolve; without this 
evolution Brazil will struggle to adapt and mitigate against climate change. 
DISCUSSION 
This paper’s purpose was to better understand the intersection between 
environmental and climate policy and agriculture development. Brazil’s mitigation and 
adaptation measures have been mostly centred on deforestation reduction because up until 
recently, deforestation reductions helped Brazil meet its climate targets. However, in line 
with the study’s hypothesis, this trend is reversing, and economic priorities are 
overshadowing climate actions. As seen, deforestation is largest in some of the biggest 
agriculture producing states; and more recently, states experiencing rapid expansion (some 
from low levels) are also facing higher deforestation. However, this trend is counter to 
sustainable economic development.  
The data showed that deforestation is impacted by two competing forces: 
environmental policy and economic development. Environmental protection is in turn 
combating climate adaptation and mitigation needs of its ecosystems through sustained 
declines in deforestation and, at the same time, an institutional framework that is based on 
a solid policy foundation but lacks a practical infrastructure. This is due to 1) lack of 
 




environmental leadership; 2) constrained capacity both financial and technical (federal, 
state, sector, and civil society); and 3) limited connectivity amongst competing interests 
(public policy, socioeconomic development, and sector growth).  
A leader can shift the environmental agenda. Bolsonaro rose to power as the 
economy struggled, poverty rates were rising, and a massive corruption scandal weakened 
faith in the country’s institutions. Bolsonaro promised to spring Brazil back to recovery. 
Since Bolsonaro’s administration took office, the agriculture sector and trade has been on 
a booming trend, but illegality and environmental degradation also rose. Early on in his 
term, Bolsonaro suggested to merge the agriculture and environment ministries in support 
of commoditizing the Amazon, reducing protection, and curtailing environmental 
activism.157 During this time, the country is seeing rising forest fires, illegal deforestation 
and is confronted with its inability to fundamentally address deforestation, exacerbating 
precarity for Brazilians.  
In theory, public policy should address these vulnerabilities, but priorities have 
tilted towards economic considerations over environmental protection and sustainable 
development; a sign that institutions are weaker than assumed. Thus far, environmental 
policy and agriculture development have mostly functioned in parallel with a few modest 
intersections; however, they must be effectively integrated to be successful in the current 
context, as well as reduce single-person dependence and outside influence.  
Public investment is funneled to areas with agribusiness presence but without the 
integration of productive and social inclusion strategies, which leads to a narrowly defined 
development strategy.158 In the end, public investment and provision of services are more 
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so driven and stimulated by strategic sector opportunities rather than the socioeconomic 
needs of affected communities. Climate policy and adaptation strategies are facing a 
similar fate. Brazil is lagging on developing a more holistic, coordinated, adaptation 
strategy that integrates command-and-control with incentives. Brazil’s institutions lack 
appropriate resourcing, are vulnerable to political influence, and its focus is often limited 
to the 4-year election cycle. Without a solid institutional infrastructure to effectively 
enforce a command-and-control approach on a consistent basis, irrespective of who is in 
office, Brazil has already lost half the battle. Add to this limited financial and economic 
incentives at all levels to incorporate sustainable agriculture practices into development, 
and the likelihood that Brazil will be able to reverse the environmental damage already 
done diminishes. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In the face of rising food demand and production, it is imperative to use all policy 
tools at our disposal to develop and implement a holistic and global approach to climate 
adaptation. The agriculture sector’s economic importance highlights that international 
discourse, strong leadership and policies have the potential to greatly influence Brazil’s 
approach to climate adaptation. In the absence of consistently effective institutions, strong 
monitoring and enforcement, Brazil’s agricultural expansion has come at the cost of higher 
deforestation, forest degradation and in turn more precarious livelihoods. The sector’s 
long-term sustainability is largely dependent on the strength of environmental policy but 
also its implementation and enforcement. 
The coordination and connectivity between national and local levels of institutions 




successfully developed and implemented. The reality is that climate change does not occur 
in a silo; it is interlinked throughout various ecosystems. Brazil needs to better integrate its 
sectoral strategies to ensure effective use of resources and maximize results. By integrating 
environmental and climate policy into economic sector strategies and policies, it can limit 
the ability to undo and weaken good policies namely strong data collection, land 
management and quantifiable targets. While further research is required to specifically 
determine policies options, integration strategies and the institutions to be made 
accountable, below are important elements central to the discussion. 
Firstly, livelihoods should be at the centre of sustainable agriculture. Economic and 
politic crises ongoing since 2015 have led to a reduction in predictability and livelihood 
consistency. A severe recession in 2020 combined with rising deforestation pre-Covid-19 
is expected to amplify the long-term impacts of deforestation on the Amazon’s ecosystem. 
This trend entails increased misuse of land, mismanagement of resources and conflict over 
resources and land. Illegal use of land and criminal activity could increase if farmers are 
left out of the system and take the limited economic options they have. Domestic policy 
and international participation are required to support sustainable agriculture, knowledge 
sharing, capacity building and collaboration through effective incentive structures that are 
accessible.   
Secondly, the private sector needs to be involved. Often, stakeholders in the fight 
against climate change are more represented by environmental groups and civil society 
than private sector companies. That said, in a globalized world, the importance of 
cooperation and collaboration with private sector companies is central to combating 




to the government’s inability to effectively manage deforestation. More recently, Brazil’s 
JBS, the world’s largest meat processing company by sales, has committed to enhance its 
supply chain monitoring and reporting to ensure cattle origins are not linked with 
deforestation.159 Following JBS’ commitment, a group of approximately “230 
nongovernment organizations, companies and associations…called on the government of 
right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro [in September 2020] to take measures to combat rising 
deforestation.”160 Ideally companies and investors would have jumped on board before 
deforestation reached these renewed heights, but, unfortunately, companies often need to 
experience the financial benefit of doing so (or the cost of not) before acting when 
considering cost-benefit calculations. The reality is that there has been limited incentive 
for the very actors that contribute most heavily to climate change to be leaders in climate 
action. Financial institutions in Brazil are increasing their role but require better policy 
support on how to implement and technical support on to verify and monitor. Investors are 
pushing for companies to consider climate risks and act to reduce them. In some cases, 
companies are taking on the responsibility proactively but in others, it could simply result 
in greenwashing. For the most part, the cost-benefit does not appear to be there yet to take 
concrete, long-lasting action. Therefore, climate policy should be geared towards tilting 
the balance to demonstrate the benefits. This is no easy feat. The piece of the puzzle 
remaining is how do we get more of them on board?  
Increasingly, major investors are placing environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) factors at a higher priority than previously when assessing investment appetite. 
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Private and public companies are facing pressure to contribute to GHG reduction from 
shareholders and civil society. The 2020 Davos meetings demonstrated that the wave of 
discourse on companies’ accountability is rising, and divestments are not entirely out of 
the realm of possibility.161 Thus far, we’ve seen stark actions taken against the government 
and Brazilian agriculture and agri-food companies in opposition to ESG and climate 
change policies. For example, JBS was recently dumped from a major investment firm’s 
portfolio due to the company’s links to deforestation in the Amazon, as well as limited 
accountability for its supply chain management.162 As noted above, JBS was quick to 
respond. These trends could mean that future investments will require significantly more 
due diligence around ESG factors. If done right, the change in how business and investment 
is done will have positive climate change effects. But, it is not yet clear what these added 
constraints could mean for local communities. Capital could become tighter or companies, 
including farmers, could face more stringent requirements. Financial access in remote areas 
is likely to remain a challenge. Big agriculture companies will have significantly more 
capacity to address their environmental impacts and incorporate climate change adaptation 
into the operations. Generally, pressure to incorporate stronger ESG policies and actions 
to incorporate climate change are disproportionately more challenging – leading to likely 
higher costs – in the developing countries than in the developed.163 In the end, smaller 
operators will be disadvantaged in a competitive market, particularly if technical assistance 
is not provided. This is where the opportunity to coordinated policy arises.  
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Future research could elaborate on targeted incentive structures that would 
stimulate sustainable development in remote locations where environmental policy 
enforcement is more challenging and security dynamics are risky. Further, deeper analysis 
of the influence trade policy and investment flows can have on climate change policy and 
adaptation could present options for private sector companies to take a more active role in 
climate change adaptation. A multidisciplinary approach that considers the diversity of 
stakeholders, drivers and impacts could present an effective strategy with innovative policy 
solutions.   
LIMITATIONS 
Data availability and frequency limited ability to conduct a thorough data and 
regression analysis to determine the quantifiable linkages between agriculture development 
and deforestation. Moreover, time constraints limited the study’s assessment of other 
economic development policy, including those related to forestry. Lastly, incorporating 
state-specific policy could have narrowed the scope of this study, thereby providing insight 
into the influence state versus federal policy and its enforcement.   
CONCLUSION 
Brazil’s role in the fight against climate change is unique. Brazil, as an agriculture 
powerhouse and home to an important carbon sink, is confronted with a massive challenge: 
taking advantage of economic benefits from rising international demand for food while 
incorporating climate adaptation and sustainable agriculture practices. This intersection is 
contributing to a complex challenge that is exacerbated by continuous economic declines, 




environmental and pro-agribusiness rhetoric. The confluence of issues is exposing the 
fragility of Brazil’s environmental and climate policy, and its institutions.  
Relatively strong policies played an important role in curbing deforestation, until 
the early to mid-2010s. Since then, the rate in deforestation and environmental degradation 
has risen rapidly. Ecosystems, livelihoods and sustainability are at risk and could have 
long-term damaging effects on Brazil and global climate. As climate change puts the 
environment and natural capital at risk, strategic development of environmental and 
climate policies will become more important to ensure economic and political stability. 
However, policy does not exist in a vacuum. The linkages between economic development, 
agriculture development and climate change are inextricable. As such, all interested parties 
have a role to play in climate adaptation, including in the development and implementation 
of policies that both enforce and incentivize environmental protection. To address 




APPENDIX 1 – MAP OF BRAZIL 
Figure 1 – Map of Brazil’s States, (Legal) Amazon and Cerrado164 





164 PRODES, 2021. Legal Amazon consist of States corresponding to three regions making up 49% of 
Brazilian land. North: Roraima, Rondônia, Pará, Amazonas, Amapá, Acre, parts of Tocantins. North-East: 
parts of Maranhão. Centre-West: Mato Grosso. The Cerrado is the entirety of Distrito Federal (Brasilia) and 
parts of 11 states making up 24% of Brazilian land. North: Tocantins and Rondônia. North-East: Maranhão, 
Piauí, Bahia, Minas Gerais. Centre-West: Matto Grosso do Sul, Goiás, Mato Grosso. South-East: São 
Paulo. South: Paraná. 




APPENDIX 2 - INSTITUTIONS 
The institutional governance mechanisms within the NPCC – the guiding legal 
framework for climate action in Brazil – are the “Interministerial Committee on Climate 
Change (CIM) and its Executive Board (GEX); and the Interministerial Commission on 
Global Climate Change (CIMGC)” with several ministries playing key roles in climate 
policy formulation.165 The MRE, Brazil’s National Focal Point for the UNFCC biennial 
update reports, had been predominantly preoccupied with preserving a conservative 
climate policy stance which prioritized its alliance with BRICS countries (especially 
China), sovereignty over the Amazon, and championing to maintain the emissions 
headroom provided to emerging economics.166 MCTIC leads the General Coordination on 
Climate (CGCL) communications to the UNFCC and chairs the Interministerial 
Commission on Global Climate Change (CIMGC) which is co-chaired by MMA. Eduardo 
& Franchini note that the MCTIC, despite its leadership role, has been “strongly influenced 
by the [MRE], and has therefore developed a position on climate change which is 
progressively inconsistent with the consensus of the national scientific community.”167 
MAPA is also highly influential in Brazil. From 2010 onwards, MAPA headed a narrative 
centred on economic growth coming up against environmental considerations.  
Despite the international context increasing MMA’s involvement in national 
climate discussions, “it is believed that the MMA has less power than the MAPA and that 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has traditionally prioritised growth over conservation.”168 
Notwithstanding, MMA is mandated to lead on environmental policy implementation and 
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“has historically been staffed by eco-minded individuals with a great interest in the 
environment and climate agendas.”169  
 




APPENDIX 3 – POLICIES 
The IPCC has presented six climate change scenarios based on rising GHG 
emissions contributing to global warming. The IPCC’s oft cited scenario stipulates that, 
under current conditions, global temperature is expected to increase by 1.5°C – inching 
towards 2°C – above pre-industrial levels between 2030 and 2052 and between 2°C to 4°C 
by 2080-2100.170 Longer-term trends in temperature increases range depending on scenario 
characteristics (e.g. population growth, global integration etc…) with the high, most 
disastrous, case increasing by 6.4°C by 2090-2099 compared to 1980-1999.171 The IPCC 
AR4 has outlined key adaptation actions that have the potential to enhance resilience in the 
agriculture sector. Porter et al. provide three primary adaptation objectives and related 
options: “(1) enhance drought and pest resistance through biotechnology and genetically 
modified crops; (2) provide financial safety nets for farmers to ensure continuation of 
farming enterprises through subsidized drought assistance and crop insurance; (3) maintain 
or enhance crop yields and suppress opportunistic agriculture pests and invasive species by 
increasing use of chemical fertilizer and pesticides.”172 Thus far, adaptation measures have 
been heavily geared towards early warning systems and “mostly address sectoral interests, 
such as agricultural practices (e.g., altering sowing times, crop cultivars and species, and 
irrigation and fertilizer control), public health measures for heat-related risks…, disaster 
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risk reduction…, and water resources (e.g., supply and demand management).”173 Due to 
the sectoral focus, socio-economic and livelihood considerations are often addressed 
through other development measures rather than incorporated into climate policy. 
POLICIES AND ACTIONS PLANS 
The inability to extrapolate with exactitude what is nature and what is 
anthropogenic challenges policymakers’ ability to implement policies solutions based on 
their causes. In Brazil, climate change is inextricably linked with deforestation and in turn 
agriculture and trade policy. At the strategic level Brazil, the NPCC and the Forest Code 
are the foundational elements. At the “tactical–operational level, the plans against 
deforestation in the Brazilian biomes (PPCDAm and PPCerrado) are the main instruments 
for the integration and articulation of anti-deforestation initiatives, including REDD+. Both 
are focused on three areas: “territorial and tenure planning, monitoring and environmental 
control and incentives for sustainable production activities.”174 The following section will 
elaborate on these instruments and policies.  
NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
Brazil’s response to international climate change dialogue was the establishment of 
the National Plan on Climate Change (NPCC), announced in 2008 at COP 14. Brazil 
voluntary targets aim to reduce GHG emissions by 36.1-38.9% below 2020 projections 
(3236 MtCO2e) mostly the reduction of deforestation in the Amazon below the 1995-2005 
average rate of 19,625 km2 by 2017.175 These voluntary international targets translated into 
compulsory domestic targets set out in national action plans (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Deforestation – Historical and Targets176 
 
Furthermore, the “NPCC is designed as an umbrella scope that includes sector-
based plans for mitigation and adaptation to climate change (e.g. Low-carbon Agriculture 
Plan – ABC Plan) and the action plans for prevention and control of deforestation in 
biomes.”177 Figure 2 illustrates the various components to the NPCC. 
Figure 2: National Policy on Climate Change components178 
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NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION 
Brazil joined the Paris Agreement in 2016, establishing its targets as part of the 
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and “all policies, measures and actions to 
implement Brazil’s NDC in the land-use scope derive from the NPCC, the 2012 Forest 
Code, the National System of Conservation Units Law and relevant mechanisms such as 
REDD+. In 2015, CONAREDD+ was created under the responsibility of MMA with the 
task of establishing ENREDD+ and formalized measures to reduce deforestation focusing 
the coordination of: 
“monitoring, finance and benefit-sharing systems, but it will be highly 
influenced by three thematic advisory boards based on three pillars for 
fostering a sustainable forest economy: (1) coordination of public policy on 
climate change and forests, (2) measurement, reporting and verification 
(MRV) of results and safeguards and (3) financing, fundraising and 
distribution of payments for REDD+ results.”179 
Brazil presents in its “NDC quantified targets for land-use change, agriculture and 
energy sectors.”180 Table 1 lists NDC’s targets for LULUCF, Agriculture and Energy are 
by far the most concrete and aggressive, evidence that natural resource management are 
central to Brazil’s climate policies.  





• Forest Code implementation and enforcement  
• Reduce illegal deforestation to zero in the Amazon until 2030 
• Compensate emissions from legal deforestation until 2030 
• Restore and reforest 12 million hectares of forests for multiple uses 
• Improve sustainable forest management measures 
Agriculture • Promote low-carbon agriculture 
• Restore 15 million hectares of degraded pasture areas and five 
million hectares of crop–livestock–forest integration system until 
2030 
 
179 Gallo and Albrecht, 2019, p. 129. 
180 Ibid., p. 128. 




Energy • Increase the participation of sustainable biofuels to 18%, including 
increased participation of advanced biofuels 
• Achieve 45% of renewable energy sources, including the use of 
sources not limited to hydropower, biomass, solar and wind 
• Achieve 10% of energy efficiency in the generation of electricity by 
2030 
• Incentive actions that promote improvements on the public 
transportation sector 
Industry • Promote new patterns for clean technologies, which incentive 
energy efficiency 
• Adopt low-carbon infrastructure in the industrial sector 
Transportation • Promote efficiency measures  
• Improve infrastructure for transport and public transportation in 
urban areas 
FOREST CODE 
The Forest Code’s success in greatly reducing deforestation rates in the early 
2000’s contributed to the view that Brazil could afford relaxing its policies, resulting in an 
updated Forest Code incorporating lobbied interests of the agribusiness complex.182 
Unfortunately, the 2012 Forest Code brought with it a “situation of extreme legal 
uncertainty and/or damage the flora and fauna” partly because of the challenging 
institutional framework surrounding land rights and titles.183 The reformed code also 
produced a thwarted incentive structure.  
The most significant changes to the Forest Code were the introduction of “new 
mechanisms such as the Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA) and the Rural 
Environmental Registry (CAR).”184 CAR’s served as “tradable legal title to areas with 
intact or regenerating native vegetation exceeding the Forest Code requirements” and the 
CRA as a form of surplus “on one property [that] may be used to offset a legal reserve debt 
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on another property within the same biome, and preferably, the same federal state.”185 The 
CAR is mandatory for all landowners and must clearly define the area and geographic 
coordinates, as well as include protected areas (including Permanent Protection Areas and 
Legal Reserves).186 This information is accumulated into an electronic database that aids 
in controlling and monitoring rural properties by way of satellite imagery.187 The Forest 
Code, in theory, is a mechanism to support the monitoring and reduction of deforestation 
as well as restoration of forests. However, enforcement is a challenge, particularly in 
remote areas, and contradicting targets and institutional overlap further slows execution.  
To illustrate the contradiction, note that the “Forest Code calls for the recovery of 
21 million hectares of natural vegetation” but this target is “much higher than the 12 million 
hectares of restored forests stated in the NDC” and provides a mechanism to circumvent 
restoration mandated by the NDC through “purchasing surplus compliance obligations 
from other properties.”188 This offsetting method to meet Forest Code and NDC targets 
“implies that the Forest Code goals could be achieved while still leaving a theoretical 
potential for legal clearing of 85 million hectares of forests...[and] allow[s] landowners 
with forest debt to purchase inexpensive offsets, while others could legally clear their own 
land.”189 Moreover, “the Forest Code relies strongly on the federal states and individual 
landowners to ensure its compliance and its success…[and] there are around 70 million 
hectares of undesignated public forestlands (for conservation or social use, for example) 
under no effective supervision” making these areas “a target of clandestine and illegal 
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exploitation.”190 Practically speaking, the overlap and incentive structure might reduce the 
effectiveness and benefits from having these institutional frameworks in place. As such, 
there is significant pressure on Brazilian action plans to move the environmental agenda 
forward.  
ACTION PLANS 
Since their respective introductions in 2004 and 2010, the National Action Plan for 
the Prevention and Control of Deforestation and Forest Fire in the Amazon–PPCDAm191 
and the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation and Forest 
Fire in the Cerrado–PPCerrado, were able to reduce deforestation rates significantly 
through pointed measures and targets. Again, measures in Brazil take the form of 
command-and-control over providing support for adaptation. Specifically, PPCDam’s aim 
is to reduce deforestation through measures such as “sanctions on producers, increased 
enforcement of environmental laws, improved monitoring, establishment of new protected 
areas and incentives for zero-deforestation production practices.”192 Additionally, 
PPCDam included several mechanisms to control deforestation such as “a ‘red list’ of 
municipalities reflecting their deforestation rates restrained rural credit in these 
sites…[and] soy products trading companies began not funding or acquiring soybeans from 
deforested areas, establishing the Soy Moratorium in 2006” and the meat moratorium in 
2009.193 These moratoriums led to “a series of agreements between private firms, NGOs, 
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for Space Research (INPE) and the creation of the Real Time Detection of Deforestation (DETER) – 
satellite tracking and monitoring of deforestation. Data is transmitted to the Brazilian Institute of 
Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA). INPE and IBAMA are the main Brazilian 
institutions involved in environmental and climate related endeavours. 
192 Milhorance and Bursztyn, 2019, p. 223. 




and the government that banned the commercialization of soy and meat coming from 
illegally deforested areas.”194  
In terms of targets for the Amazon, they consisted of an 80% reduction of 
deforestation (primary objective of the PPCDAm), translating into a 55% cut in emissions 
by 2020.195 Similarly, for the Cerrado, targets were set at a 40% of decrease in the 
deforestation rates (primary objective of the PPCerrado). Eduardo & Franchini highlight 
the noteworthy declines in deforestation which “reduced Brazilian GHG emissions by 
approximately 25–30% between 2005 and 2009, and owes its success to several factors 
including enhanced institutional capacity, the designation of protected areas and greater 
public awareness.196 Despite aggressive targets and temporary successes in reducing 
deforestation rates, Brazil is once again experiencing a jump in deforestation reaching 
10,896 km2 in the Amazon and 6,483 km2 in the Cerrado in 2019197; much of which could 
be considered illegal in major agriculture producing states such as Mato Grosso.198 
Regrettably, history has shown that competing economic interests may be a tough barrier 
to overcome.   
REDD+ 
At REDD+’s core are national funds including the Amazon Fund (2008) and the 
National Climate Change Fund, or Climate Fund (2009). The Climate Fund, “linked to the 
MMA[,]…guarantee[s] resources to finance actions that aim to mitigate climate change” 
and specific to forests, “mainly supports activities intended for improving the efficiency 
 
194 Eduardo & Franchini, 2014, p. 683. 
195 Gallo and Albrecht, 2019, p. 127. 
196 Eduardo and Franchini, 2014, p. 681. 
197 Using 2019 data to link to next citation. PRODES, 2021.  




and sustainability of the production of charcoal and fostering sustainable forest 
management.”199 The Amazon Fund, on the other hand, is an accredited entity able to 
receive funding from the Green Climate Fund (GFC), a priority funding institution for 
climate adaptation. The Amazon Fund is managed by the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), functions on “a payment-for-performance fundraising model…to support 
conservation and contribute to GHG emission reductions in the Amazon biome,” and is 
closely connected to PPCDAm.200 Yet, funding is limited: “the Amazon Fund has raised 
only 5% of the potential generated by REDD+ [and]…is up to date the only accredited 
entity.”201 While the Amazon Fund’s mandate was extended to December 2021 in the face 
of rising deforestation rates, allocations were diminished due to poor performance and 
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